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THE KEY TO VALUE: THE DEBATE 
OVER COMMENSURABILITY IN 
NEOCLASSICAL AND CREDIT 




As a discipline, economics has famously eschewed debates over the definition 
of money. Economist André Orléan, summing up the approach, describes money 
as a “peripheral fact, a secondary device, a mere adjunct” to the concept of 
“utility” at the center of the neoclassical theory of value.1 That position is rooted 
in epistemological principle. Most economists prize the market’s capacity to 
reveal the values prioritized by individuals. In its ideal operation, the net sorting 
of private choices produces a distribution of goods and services that maximizes 
human well-being. By inviting individuals to express and order their preferences, 
the market thus conceived holds the potential to reconcile individual self-
determination with aggregate social welfare. That neoclassical epistemology 
engenders a particular approach to money: as a measure of comparison, money 
emanates from the process of expressing preferences. Money is, in other words, 
an artifact of choice in the model—thus the “peripheral fact” that Orléan 
describes. 
The neoclassical model is supposed to capture essential elements of the 
economy, if not its detail in actual experience. The basic character of economic 
activity implied in the model is barter: agents compare the goods they have 
against those they want in order to trade as warranted to increase their own 
satisfaction. The focus is on the exchange of “real” objects—the goods and 
services understood to be at the heart of material productivity. In many accounts, 
the activity of comparison produces money unproblematically: once we assume 
ratios of value, commensurability—comparability of goods in a common unit—
appears. After all, if the value that market activity concerns can be theorized to 
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precede that market, it should be articulable in some measure.2 According to 
classical commentators, some item emerges from the set of valued items and acts 
to measure its counterparts.3 In more modern renditions, money can be a unit 
without intrinsic value, a measuring convention like the inch or the pound.4 Like 
an inch or a pound, the monetary unit is simply a quantum of pre-existing value. 
And as a vehicle for comparison, the medium does not affect the activity of 
choosing (although political communities can interfere with economic activity by 
disturbing money’s operation). 
A problem perennial in the neoclassical model is that money in the real world 
does not take the form assigned it in the model. Rather than a commodity or a 
convention, money appears again and again in historical experience to be a credit 
medium. Moreover, rather than emanating from the plethora of individuated 
comparisons that people undertake in order to barter, moneys appear to emerge 
when states or political communities design them to coordinate and mobilize for 
war and other public initiatives. Thus most, perhaps all, major modern moneys 
are sovereign liabilities—IOUs of the governments that issue them.5 The 
commercial bank deposits that multiply the money supply are, likewise, a credit 
medium. Privately extended, they hold value only in reference to the public base 
money they promise; they are privileged for use and supported by the national 
banks that modulate that sovereign unit of account. In that sense, commercial 
banks are akin to franchisees of the government.6 Privately issued bank money 
therefore fits within the monetary project of governing sovereigns, as a kind of 
public credit money by delegation. 
This Article sketches an alternative approach to commensurability and value 
that is consistent with the modern moneys we observe. The argument begins by 
taking the neoclassical approach to money seriously. Against that baseline, it 
becomes clear that conceptualizing money as credit has implications that are 
arrestingly different. It means that we must look to the character of money as 
credit because that character affects the exchange made with it. If that is right, we 
need to reconsider value and its relationship to the market and the decisions 
 
 2.  For a highly developed argument that mainstream economics presupposes a substantive theory 
of value, see id. at 9–84. 
 3.  See, e.g., 3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, pt. II, § II (1739–40); John Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, ch. V, §§ 46–47, 50 (London, Rivington, 
12th ed. 1824); John Locke, Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money, in 1 LOCKE 
ON MONEY 410 (Patrick Hyde Kelly ed., 1991) [hereinafter Further Considerations]. 
 4.  See, e.g., James Tobin, Money, in MONETARY ECONOMICS 224–25 (Steven N. Durlauf & 
Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
 5.  For the statutory definition of the dollar along those lines, see, for example, 12 U.S.C. § 411 
(2018) and 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018). Here, I assume the character of modern money as credit. Considering 
that character, the evidence supporting it, and changes in the design of money as credit has been the 
subject of much of my earlier work. See, e.g., CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, 
AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM (2014); Christine Desan, Money as a Legal Institution, in MONEY IN 
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 18 (Wolfgang Ernst & David Fox eds., 2014). 
 6.  Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 
1147 (2017). 
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made there. The market is not a forum for the expression of pre-existing 
preferences. Rather, the process by which communities make money and put it 
into circulation as credit shapes the way economic decisions occur. We will have 
to rethink that process, its relationship to choice, and the challenges to equality 
that come with market exchange in a medium made out of credit. 
Part II of this Article explores the paradox sketched above—the striking 
incongruity between the conceptualization of money in neoclassical thought and 
its recurring character in political communities. I argue that the neoclassical 
model of the economy presumes a particular approach to value and money. That 
approach enables, indeed encourages, adherents to believe in the basic autonomy 
of the market, at least as an ideal. And that ideal has great normative power: it 
casts the market as presumptively democratic, in fact more democratic than 
representative politics, because only in the economic arena are individual 
choices, independently made, directly and equally effective in creating an 
equilibrium. 
That vision, however appealing, turns on an axiomatic approach to money 
that is not conceptually sound. In particular, we cannot assume that the act of 
comparison, carried out across different objects by many independent actors, 
creates commensurability at the level of value’s expression over the relevant 
universe of entities compared. On second look, the Walrasian model at the heart 
of general equilibrium theory claims no such thing.7 In that model, the unit of 
account precedes rather than follows the act of comparison. Partial equilibrium 
models likewise assume a working medium. In other words, neoclassical thought 
itself ascribes a unit that will make value commensurable. The unit is abstract and 
therefore neutral; it is a device that transparently expresses value without more. 
That move is essential to every activity that follows: it enables comparison, 
choice, and, eventually, exchange. It thus makes possible market activity as a 
process that aggregates individualized preferences and produces prices. 
Having assumed a unit that makes values commensurable, neoclassical 
thinkers can relegate all other questions about what actual money is and what 
role it plays to the realm of applied science.8 That deferral is terrifically enabling. 
It allows economists to explain actually observed moneys that don’t conform to 
the abstraction in ways consistent with normative premises of equilibrium 
models. Thus neoclassical thinkers define money in the real world in ways that 
tack close to their presumptions about how money should look: they assume that 
exchange activity among equally situated individuals suffices to produce a 
medium as bartering individuals converge on a commodity or agree to an empty 
measure as a convention. Although those moneys fail to resemble the unit of 
 
 7.  For a concise overview of the model, introduced by Léon Walras in the late nineteenth century, 
see ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 13–14, 39–50.  
 8.  Cf. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Implications 
of the Financial Crisis for Economics, Speech Presented at the Conference Co-Sponsored by the Center 
for Economic Policy Studies and the Bendheim Center for Finance 2–5 (Sept. 24, 2010) (distinguishing 
an economic “science” of fundamentals from economic “engineering” in the applied sense). 
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account imputed by Walras—they are either material and non-neutral or non-
material and meaningless—those problems are not categorized as fatal.9 To the 
contrary, economists can correct for monetary dynamics while identifying those 
dynamics as distortions, given money’s deviation in the real world from the 
Walrasian abstraction.  
In effect, neoclassical economics imputes a term to resolve the challenge of 
commensurability at the conceptual level: it assumes money as an abstract and 
neutral unit of account. The discipline subsequently explains moneys actually 
observed: it focuses here on money as a medium emerging from trade. The sleight 
of hand submerges the issue of incommensurable values. Incongruities are set 
aside as the byproduct of difficulties on the ground. 
Part III of this Article treats the Walrasian recognition that commensuration 
precedes choice as an invitation. It begins by recognizing that, just as the 
sequence in the model suggests, participants in a market, conceptual or real, 
establish a unit of account before beginning the process of comparing otherwise 
incommensurable values.10 That money is created by something other than their 
decentralized choice, activity that can take place only when the auction occurs. 
In fact, we know that modern societies regularly create money out of public credit 
that is packaged to have material worth and to circulate. Those societies install 
value in a unit by identifying that unit with an obligation owed to the group, 
giving the unit out as payment when resources are needed in advance by the 
group, and accepting it back in satisfaction of the obligation.11 
Once participants have a unit that substantiates value cognizable to all or 
virtually all participants, they can use it in exchange. Emerging from a world 
heterogeneous in so many aspects, participants now have a unit with a common 
reference point and meaningful worth over time. They offer and take it for 
objects and services. Their practice of exchange produces prices. 
Commensurability in the new money emerges from that activity. Value, as it is 
articulated in this money, is not pre-existing but rather produced. 
The parameters of this observation are both specific and capacious. On the 
one hand, the argument reaches value as it occurs in the monetary realm, not 
beyond it. Many communities have ordered relations without money and many 
aspects of our experience, even in the modern world, elude or repel expression 
in that medium. Human desire, appetite, and need make us prize certain things, 
people, or qualities independent of their being articulated in money. 
On the other hand, the monetary realm is vast. It represents all exchange that 
occurs because and insofar as money as a medium makes items comparable. That 
commensurability alone allows the kind of ranking, a comparative relation, that 
 
 9.  Walras’s model assumed a monetary unit that was material (one among commodity goods) and 
could measure other goods without affecting their value. For discussion, see MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC 
THEORY IN RETROSPECT 144 (5th ed. 1996). 
 10.  Thanks to Jeremy Stein for discussion that clarified the importance of the sequence. 
 11.  In the interim, societies support money’s use as a medium, thus constructing an instrument that 
circulates. I leave that defining feature of money aside here. 
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persuades observers to understand the market as a coherent terrain of decision-
making. Thus economists understand “price,” for all its inconsistencies, to 
express a set of real choices, the aggregate work of comparative ordering. In turn, 
they hold out the hope that maximizing individual preferences, identified through 
price, can move us towards increased social welfare. None of those assumptions 
can stand without the shared term that makes comparison possible across an 
ocean of goods. The construction of that term is therefore critical to the market 
as we know it.12 
That conclusion directs attention to the nature of money. In a very 
preliminary way, this Article sketches the implications that follow if, as it appears 
in the modern world, money is in fact a medium of credit. Most striking is a 
feature of money that appears to be structural to that character. The agents that 
coordinate the production of credit money—governments and commercial banks 
in our system—create that measure and medium in order to spend or loan it to 
specific parties. By contrast, they have no reason to issue money evenly across a 
population. If so, then money, by definition, enters circulation selectively, spent 
or loaned to certain hands. That feature means that markets, at least markets 
made in money, are based on a measuring resource—money—that is allocated 
unevenly across participants. 
This is true at a formal level. Commensurability, according to this view, is a 
matter produced when a group restructures its internal relationships, creating a 
unit of value that can act as a comparative and injecting that unit into 
circulation.13 The nature of credit as the medium matters in that process. Credit 
works by advancing a unit of monetary value to some people relative to others. 
In that case, as a condition inherent to its construction, money carries value 
differentially to participants, those who are graced with credit and those who are 
not. 
If so, we cannot assume that everyone comparing value has access to the 
comparative, if only as a unit of account, that will express his or her preferences. 
Money as a credit medium operates by creating capacity as a relative resource. 
The process of money’s dissemination articulates value in that unit. In turn, 
representations of value manifested as prices are produced in the activity of deals 
made for the monetary unit. The results embed both the facility and disparity 
represented in the medium. Models that assume money as a neutral measure, 
hypothetically accessible as a valuing tool if not a factor endowment, do not give 
us information that can be understood as a reflection of people’s preferences. 




 12.  I am grateful to Roy Kreitner for his insightful commentary on this point.  
 13.  We will see that the activity of comparing incommensurables cannot produce its own measure. 
Nor does an abstract term, given its inability to refer to any substantiated value, supply any coherent 
relation to it.  
FINAL - DESAN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2020  3:51 PM 
6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:1 
II 
THE NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH 
Most neoclassical thinkers believe that “the choices of the agent reflect her/his 
preferences, and . . . the preferences of the agent (even when s/he is not selfish), 
in turn, reflect the welfare of the agent.”14 In this formulation, value precedes 
commercial exchange; it is the “hidden property that is logically prior to such 
transactions and that gives them form.”15 Orléan agrees that the commitment to 
pre-existing value is central to mainstream economics. In his view, that principle 
organizes economic thought. As he observes, “exchange exists because there is 
value—value being understood as the distinctive quality of tradable 
commodities.”16 That is true whether scholars attribute value to labor or to the 
utility of scarce resources, and whether they attempt to model the expression of 
choice in general equilibrium theory or in more dynamic partial equilibrium 
processes that sort market results by competitive selection and exclusion.17 All 
are attempts to understand how recognizing underlying value, in ways that may 
be unknown to market actors themselves, “orders the apparent anarchy of 
market exchange.”18 
According to this approach, the economic process is resolutely comparative; 
it assumes a way of measuring the value of real things or their characteristics 
against each other.19 Ideally, the exercise itself produces a measure. In 
Schumpeter’s words, it is “the exchange ratios between the commodities that are 
the really important thing ‘behind’ money prices,”20 or, according to those in the 
Marshallian tradition, “the ratio of the marginal utility of the two goods 
exchanged.”21 The basic point is that some commensurability in value allows 
comparison among the wide heterogeneity of commodifiable items. Neoclassical 
theory has split again and again in its debates over value, from the subjectivism 
of Bentham’s utility to the methods for comparing pairs of preferences.22 Implicit 
across those debates, however, is an agreement that comparison is possible, even 
if in an abstract term. 
 
 14.  YAHYA M. MADRA, LATE NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: THE RESTORATION OF 
THEORETICAL HUMANISM IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THEORY 15 (2017) (emphasis in original). 
 15.  ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 13. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See id. at 9–12  (reviewing the shift from labor to utility theories of value); see also MADRA, 
supra note 14, at 13, 48–60 (considering the use of auction and evolutionary arguments in neoclassical 
theories of value). 
 18.  ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 13. For that aspiration as a historically developed ideology, see 
generally JONATHAN SHEEHAN & DROR WAHRMAN, INVISIBLE HANDS: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (2015). 
 19.  Commentators often loosely identify preferences for commodities per se, while others specify 
the utility of their underlying properties or characteristics. See ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 42–43 
(discussing Kelvin Lancaster’s work, which defined utility as an objective quality). 
 20.  JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 277 (Elizabeth Boody 
Schumpeter ed., 1954). 
 21.  MADRA, supra note 14, at 13.  
 22.  Id. at 4–6, 13, 48–60.  
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In fact, abstraction may be essential for most theorists. The market is a 
conceptual device, a phenomenon that registers and reflects preferences. 
Exchange in turn represents the fact that those preferences, once identified, can 
be reordered. The Walrasian auction is only the most elegant representation of 
that process. In that model, the critical moment occurs when participants 
recognize value and rank it. By contrast, exchange is simply the execution of 
those decisions. Thus, “exchangeability is considered to be directly implied,” after 
the act of judgment in which individuals make their choices.23 Actual exchange 
and the terms on which it occurs is a different subject, one that raises issues of 
application, rather than questions of the first order.24 The truck-and-bartering 
individuals that Adam Smith made famous are merely carrying out the 
commands, we learn, of their inner ideal decision-makers.25 
The normative stakes of the neoclassical vision are profound. Within that 
frame, the autonomy of individuals—the fact that they make value choices 
independent of any influence or mediation—ensures freedom from coercion. 
Those actors find sovereignty and equal voice insofar as their preferences operate 
to determine the relative value of goods and services. In order to respect the 
choices made by individuals, we should preserve that underlying distribution so 
far as we can. Their decentralized action is the most democratic of expressions. 
In fact, economists claim a connection between the market and the 
democratic form explicitly. Milton Friedman legitimates the economic space as, 
itself, democratic: “The great advantage of the market . . . is that it permits wide 
diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each 
man can vote, as it were, for the color of tie he wants.”26 Kenneth Arrow 
generalizes the logic, suggesting an isomorphism between the economy and 
politics in “a capitalist democracy”: 
[T]here are essentially two methods by which social choices can be made: voting, 
typically used to make ‘political’ decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used 
to make ‘economic’ decisions. . . .  
. . . The methods of voting and the market . . . are methods of amalgamating the tastes 
of many individuals in the making of social choices.27 
The exercise of preferences in the market can be tuned in a populist key. 
Friedrich Hayek recast the ideal of expressing choice into a method of gathering 
 
 23.  ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 17.   
 24.  Those working out early partial equilibrium models took a similar approach. Thus Alfred 
Marshall would assume a medium and give it unchanging marginal utility for his model, while only 
subsequently accommodating the impact of money flows in the real world by way of a money demand 
function. See HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 567, 583–84 (3d ed. 
1991). 
 25.  In fact, we might understand neoclassical responses to “income” approaches, like that of Ralph 
Hawtrey, and to Keynesian theory in particular as categorizing the challenges raised there as problems 
of application, therefore short-term issues of transition, rather than challenges to the fundamental 
structure of assumptions underlying classical and neoclassical thought. See generally RALPH HAWTREY, 
CURRENCY AND CREDIT (1919). 
 26.  MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (1962).  
 27.  KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1–2 (3d ed. 2012). 
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information, thus elevating the diffuse wisdom of entrepreneurs over the claimed 
expertise of centralized planners.28 
This conception of the market and its normative stakes explains the 
neoclassical approach to money and practitioners’ intransigence on the matter. 
Preserving the integrity of the comparative exercise and all that it promises 
invites, or perhaps requires, abstracting the definition of money, that is, 
blackboxing the unit of account. At the same time, the discipline in applied fields 
can accommodate the practical reality that a medium of exchange will exist to 
facilitate the actual exercise of reordering goods. The combination will guard the 
neutrality in principle of the unit in which value is expressed, while 
acknowledging slippage in the real world. 
Perhaps the most common method of blackboxing the unit of account is to 
assume that one among the commodities traded in a market can act as the 
measure of other commodities in that market. In that case, the commodity, which 
Walras called a “numeraire” when used as a comparative unit, can be set equal 
to one—it expresses its own value after all—and then deployed to measure other 
goods. In neoclassical models, the numeraire is a measuring fiction; no one holds 
it as a store of value, an intervention that would upset the project of measuring 
all commodities against all others in terms of their utility for consumption or 
productivity.29 James Tobin takes pains to distinguish the numeraire as a 
mathematical supposition from the money actually used to set prices.30 But that 
is precisely the point for our purposes: in their effort to hypothesize a measure, 
economists split money into its constituent functions. They theorize its identity 
as a measure separately from money as a transactional medium, store of value, 
or mode of payment. As Mark Blaug writes about the numeraire, “this kind of 
money serves only as an abstract unit of account; it may exist in a physical sense 
but it need not and trade has all the characteristics of barter.”31 
That conclusion is empowering. Having assumed commensurability, the 
market for real things can exist independently of a medium. As Blaug describes 
the circumstances in which the numeraire operates, “the medium of exchange 
being an arbitrary commodity like any other—the total value of all goods 
demanded is always identically equal to the total value of all goods supplied.”32 
We can then hypothesize the trade of commodities directly for one another by 
value; consumer demand thus informs the decisions of producers. As Frank Hahn 
summarizes this logic and its consequence, “the best developed model of the 
economy cannot find room for [money]” at all, given the zero sum logic.33 
 
 28.  F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520–21 (1945). 
 29.  See BLAUG, supra note 9, at 144; Tobin, supra note 4, at 224, 231.   
 30.  Tobin, supra note 4, at 232; see also MADRA, supra note 14, at 13 (analogizing abstract nature 
of utility ratios). 
 31.  BLAUG, supra note 9, at 144.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  FRANK HAHN, MONEY AND INFLATION 1 (1982). 
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Partial equilibrium models, by a somewhat different route, likewise assume 
commensurability. Focusing more narrowly on one segment of a market, they 
incorporate competition over time into their analyses of market equilibrium. 
Whereas general equilibrium models assume adjustments in price offered to all 
simultaneously, partial equilibrium models often aim at a process of quantity 
adjustment by competitors in a particular industry over a certain period. There, 
given demand and the costs of production, “those who cannot survive [at] the 
equilibrium price leave the market.”34 Price and budget constraints, put in money 
terms, are key assumptions. And, if not an abstract numeraire, money remains an 
entity that acts without a clear identity. Writing in the New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics, Tobin pondered how something could hold value as a medium 
given that, “[a]ccording to standard theory, something can have positive value 
only if it generates positive marginal utility in individuals’ consumption or 
positive marginal utility productivity in the making of goods and services.”35 
Although he found no clear answer to the puzzle of how money could be so 
categorized, efforts to crack the puzzle continued. In the meantime, as Tobin put 
it, “what is universal and important is that something is chosen [as money], not 
what is chosen.”36 
The intuition of real exchange is thus entrenched around an imputed unit of 
account. It remains only to make sense of money’s existence and role in the real 
world. There, the same intuition shows the way: once we have resolved the 
problem of commensurability, comparison is possible but for smaller challenges, 
mere frictions in a system that is conceptually operational. Those challenges can 
be resolved by decentralized activity—barter that produces a medium, or a 
convention that produces an agreed upon measure—that is consistent with the 
normative vision of the market as an individuated matter. 
As economist after economist emphasizes, real exchange—barter—in the real 
world is an unwieldy affair, haunted by difficulties and delays as participants 
struggle to overcome obstacles of distance, information, and time, as well as 
differences in quantity and in quality that set apart what they have to exchange 
from what they want to gain that way.37 Those problems—all failures of a “double 
coincidence of wants”—generate the need for money: economists almost 
 
 34.  Yahya M. Madra, Auction or Selection? Two Competing (Neoclassical) Metaphors for “The 
Economy” 8 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke University Center for the History of 
Political Economy). 
 35.  Tobin, supra note 4, at 232. 
 36.  Id. at 225. Typical introductory macroeconomics textbooks exhibit a similar logic. They discuss 
the economy “in the long run,” free from monetary distortions; those are set aside for consideration of 
“the short term” with attention to monetary dynamics. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
MACROECONOMICS (5th ed. 2003). But the economy in the long run is a moneyed economy: a unit of 
account exists and is presumed even as the focus is on the real economy.  
 37.  See, e.g., id. at 158; FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 57–59 (9th ed. 2010); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: 
Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 (1997); Tobin, supra note 4, at 224–25; see also Neil 
Wallace, Lawrence R. Klein Lecture 2000: Whither Monetary Economics?, 42 INT’L ECON. REV. 847 
(2001) (locating the need for credit and monitoring in lack of double coincidence of wants). 
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uniformly explain it as a means of reducing the static of barter. As Tobin 
summarizes, “the reason for the universality of money . . . is that it facilitates 
trade.”38 It dissolves the barriers that make barter so “awkward and inefficient.”39 
The double coincidence of wants is an applied problem, not a theoretical one. 
If people had the wherewithal, they would be able to find and make the trades 
they wish. That is, they understand the relative values of everyone’s 
possessions—they merely need to find the right partner at the right time with the 
right quantity and quality of goods they desire. Trade is a matter of degree, if you 
will; an image that invites commentators to posit that money emerges from 
existing trade to facilitate subsequent trade. 
Note that the sequence reverses the logic of the conceptual models. Those 
models recognize that a unit of account must be postulated both before 
comparison takes place and in order to allow comparison to take place. Exchange 
takes place subsequent to those choices; it merely carries them out. By contrast, 
applied explanations rely on exchange to generate a unit of account. Much of the 
time that happens on the ground. People converge on a commodity unit by 
migrating towards an item that can serve as a medium, thus the classics like Carl 
Menger’s “most saleable commodity,”40 and Karl Marx’s approach to gold as the 
“universal equivalent.”41 Some of the time, participants in an exchange 
community simply accept a suitable item by convention, thus John Locke’s claim 
that silver was, by acclaim, “the money of account, and measure of trade, all 
through the world.”42 
The problem of commensurability is different. It poses the challenge of 
comparison: how is it possible to compare an orange to an advance of resources, 
or a dog to military service? What about the relationship of any of those to the 
possession of land or art, or to the obligation to support the public order? That 
question, infinitely harder, is virtually nonexistent in the economic literature on 
money.43 That neglect, in contrast to the intense focus on the issue of the double 
coincidence of wants, occurs because Walras’s auction has done its work. It has 
established the intuitive power of the market-as-a-huge-bazaar, an orgy of real 
exchange among objects of comparable value.44 Once we imagine the operational 
auction (or existing trade carried out in money), we recognize friction or 
 
 38.  Tobin, supra note 4, at 224. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  CARL MENGER, ON THE ORIGINS OF MONEY 263 § 2 (1892). 
 41.  KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 162 (Ben Fowkes trans., 1976). 
 42.  Further Considerations, supra note 3, at 422 § 2; see also R. A. Radford, The Economic 
Organisation of a P.O.W. Camp, 12 ECONOMICA 190 (1945) (“[C]igarettes rose from the status of a 
normal commodity to that of currency.”); Tobin, supra note 4, at 225 (“General agreement to the 
convention, not the particular media agreed upon, is the source of money’s immense value to society.”).   
 43.  One could argue that the question of commensurability haunts the economic literature insofar 
as that work grapples with the issue of how to understand subjective value or utility. But those efforts do 
not articulate the problem as the reason for money’s existence.  
 44.  Existing markets in the real world, markets made with money, have the same effect. Indeed, 
those markets—characterized by trade enabled by money—are surely the inspiration for Walras’s 
auction.  
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obstruction as plausibly providing a reason for money. That reason obscures the 
conceptually prior possibility that money is necessary to create commensurability. 
Setting the challenge of commensurability aside, we have a problem that is 
manageable within the terms of neoclassical thought. Decentralized activity can 
resolve frictions if items are comparable. In particular, that decentralized activity 
can produce an object—a commodity or a convention of measure—that 
facilitates the market if there is enough decentralized activity (that is, enough of 
a market) in the first place. (Never mind the circularity; assuming 
commensurability allows a significant amount of trade to occur without money.) 
Finally, the “convergence” story about money’s creation tacitly reinforces the 
discipline’s normative stake in the market’s democratic character. Most 
evidently, a wide range of participants have vetted the medium and chosen to 
accept it; apparently, they could opt out if they preferred. As a medium, money 
is hypothetically available to all as a measuring tool, although not a factor 
endowment. In that important sense, it is distributively neutral—even though we 
will find it unevenly accumulated by individuals. 
Of course, there are distortions that separate this applied world we have 
constructed from the conceptual one. Thus the moneys hypothesized by 
economists as emerging from barter or convention do not resemble the 
numeraire. Either they carry value as money and therefore depart from the 
definition of a commodity equivalent that Hahn and Tobin imputed to the 
numeraire, or they have no intrinsic value and therefore provide no coherent 
reference for measuring that quality. In the first category are all those items 
selected as money because bartering agents prefer them increasingly until they 
emerge as a medium. The very act of bartering for a commodity preferentially 
because it will be used as a unit of account changes the value of the commodity. 
That disqualifies it from acting as a sister commodity in the Walrasian model. In 
the contemporary neoclassical literature, a set of models that posit moneys that 
are “productive”—necessary to resolve cash-in-advance requirements or 
transactional frictions—fail for this reason.45 As Neil Wallace argues, general 
equilibrium theory assumes complete competitive markets; it is therefore 
inconsistent with a money that is productive in its ability to aid transactions.46 
Wallace in turn crafts a theory of money according to which an intrinsically 
worthless object is circulated as evidence of past behavior. That is, one gives 
money as a token to document a good or service provided; the money produces 
information on the behavior of contracting parties as opposed to resolving 
transactional frictions.47 Wallace acknowledges that his theory is inconsistent 
with the assumption in general equilibrium theory that markets for credit are 
 
 45.  Wallace, supra note 37, at 847–48. 
 46.  Id. at 848–49.  
 47.  Id.; see also Neil Wallace, The Mechanism-Design Approach to Monetary Theory, in 3A 
HANDBOOK OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 4–5 (Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford eds., 2011) 
(discussing the benefits of a mechanism design approach to monetary theory); MARTIN SHUBIK, 1 THE 
THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 322 (1999) (arguing for an alternative approach to 
the price system to reconcile micro and macroeconomics).  
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perfect, but argues that the departure will be worthwhile given his theory’s ability 
to account for money’s existence.48 But there is another problem he does not 
recognize: his account does not explain how heterogeneous items become 
commensurable. Narratives that propose an empty measure provide no reference 
point against which comparison can proceed. Money, even if considered only as 
a unit of account, is nothing like an inch or a pound. Those metrics are more like 
denominations; they divide a matter already commensurable, like linear space or 
weight. By contrast, money creates a reference point for an amorphous matter: 
value. To this day, neither economists nor philosophers have agreed upon how to 
conceptualize the “value” of time, goods, services, satisfactions, or desires. Once 
that is done monetarily—the whole trick—no one really cares much how 
denominations are ordained to subdivide existing value. 
The moneys constructed by economists, aimed as they are to explain 
problems of transactional frictions or informational shortfalls, therefore do not 
satisfy the demand implied by the conceptual models for a unit that enables 
commensurability. Somewhat ironically, that shortfall does not suggest the 
inadequacy of those models for those advocating them. Recall that, given the role 
that economists have identified for money as a medium—its operation to mitigate 
the interference to the ideal market posed by real world conditions—the issue of 
money is understood as a second-order problem. Economists can correct for 
monetary dynamics while categorizing those dynamics as distortions given 
money’s deviation in the real world from the abstract numeraire. 
Those distortions may be grave. The fact that commodity moneys never 
behaved like the commodity they contained bedeviled the European medieval 
world. Gresham’s law, competitive debasements, and the bewildering traps of 
bimetallism followed from the fact that money’s face value diverged from its 
metallic value—and would always diverge, no matter if individuals knew the 
metallic value down to the grain. The issues raised in the modern world are 
arguably more profound. Keynes’s notion of liquidity preference turns on the 
point that people value a medium for its “moneyness,” a utility it carries that 
affects its value and people’s desire to hold it.49 That demand interferes with the 
identity of savings with investment. Another problem occurs because cash, the 
transactional medium, has long been supplemented, one might say submerged, 
by a thick layer of financial assets offering different degrees of liquidity and 
different returns for risk. That market also complicates the flow of savings into 
investment, arguably obstructing it.50 Much of macroeconomics and monetary 
 
 48.  Wallace, supra note 47, at 4–5. 
 49.  John Hicks may have been the first to use the term “moneyness” in this sense. See JOHN HICKS, 
VALUE AND CAPITAL: AN INQUIRY INTO SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC THEORY 
163 (1947). 
 50.  Tobin, supra note 4, at 239–40.  
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policy might be understood as dealing with the consequences, the distortions to 
the ideal, that result.51 
In short, neoclassical economics has produced a position on money dictated 
by the discipline’s implicit theory of value. Mainstream approaches assume that 
value pre-exists interaction. They prioritize the choice that individuals make 
among valued goods as a critical act of self-determination and assume the process 
of exchange as the execution of that choice. In order to make the comparative 
process cognizable, they posit an abstract and neutral unit of account that 
precedes and facilitates that activity. At the same time, neoclassical approaches 
accommodate money in practice (that is, in the real world) as a medium 
constructed by individuals who, already able to compare goods, face frictions in 
the exchange. Those frictions are a second-order problem, one that makes trade 
difficult but not impossible. In fact, in the applied realm, trade—the activity that 
only executes choice in equilibrium analysis—produces money as a means of 
facilitating more exchange. The role and salience of exchange confirms the 
market as a decentralized phenomenon, consistent with the democratic vision of 
free choice as the base of neoclassical commitments. The distortions that occur 
in the real world will be managed by fixes that are also second-order. 
 
III 
MONEY AS A PUBLIC CREDIT MEDIUM 
Money is not so easily tamed; again and again it violates the neoclassical 
edifice constructed to house it. That is incontrovertibly true in the contemporary 
world, where money does not resemble the numeraire; neither is it a commodity 
nor a signifier empty of material value.52 Virtually all modern sovereign moneys 
are credit mediums that entail material value, unit by unit. They are created by 
governments or, as in the case of the European Union, consortia of governments. 
Those authorities create an official unit of account, control issue of that unit, and 
take it back for taxes and other public payments. (If a debtor does not have 
money, a government will confiscate goods of an equal “monetary” value, thus 
providing a material anchor for its currency.) Governments further support the 
value of their sovereign moneys by privileging its travel between individuals: 
officials enforce transactions for value made in the official monetary unit. 
American courts, for example, default to the dollar as the medium that states and 
 
 51.  See MICHEL BEAUD & GILLES DOSTALER, ECONOMIC THOUGHT SINCE KEYNES: A HISTORY 
AND DICTIONARY OF MAJOR ECONOMISTS 29 (1997) (discussing the differences between economic 
models that assume money supply is endogenous and models that assume it is exogenous).   
 52.  Even coin, often assumed to circulate as a commodity, operated as a public credit money, if its 
design in Britain is representative. The government there clearly authored money, determined that it 
should operate at face value, committed to accepting it for public payment, and privileged its use in 
individual exchange. Given that character, coin’s metal content acted as a kind of collateral—for both 
users and the government, while the coin’s nominal value depended on the government’s credit. In fact, 
one way to understand the argument over whether coin traveled at “extrinsic” (or face) value or the 
“intrinsic” value of its metal content is that the debate concerns whether coin was a credit money or a 
simple commodity. I canvas the evidence and argument in DESAN, supra note 5, at 70–107. 
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conveys the value necessary to settle contracts, to redress injuries in tort, to 
convey property, and to comply with myriad other requirements from 
jurisdictional thresholds to regulatory standards.53 
Money issued by commercial banks—a profuse source of money since the 
nineteenth century—fits within the architecture constructed for the dollar and 
other sovereign moneys. Commercial banks issue credit denominated in the 
official unit of account in the form of private promises-to-pay money to one 
sovereign or another. Those representations of private credit—bank deposits—
are treated as money, not just credit: they hold immediate purchasing power. And 
they hold that purchasing power because they are embedded in national 
payments systems that allow banks to clear their obligations against each other, 
borrow from each other, and depend on the central bank for help—all in the 
official unit of account. In that way, public credit money systems add “elasticity” 
to the monetary base. That is, they include an avenue for the money supply to 
expand in response to the demand by individuals who want money for their own 
purposes.54 
The character of modern moneys suggests a solution to the conundrum about 
commensurability that haunts the neoclassical approach. Communities do in fact 
require a unit to render value commensurable before participants set about the 
enterprise of comparing goods. The neoclassical theorists correctly insist on that 
logic. But the monetary unit is neither an abstraction, nor a commodity that 
costlessly distinguishes itself, nor an empty measure. Rather, communities 
construct a unit of account by creating a token that carries value relevant to each 
participant. They do that in the figure of credit that is good to satisfy political 
dues or, in the case of bank-issued money, credit that is good to repay an 
advance—thus the pattern of credit money that we find pervasive across the 
modern world. 
Once participants have a comparative unit, they use it in exchange. That 
practice puts a money value—a price—on goods and other commodities. The 
practice of exchange with a unit of comparative value therefore creates 
commensurability and, by that token (literally), articulates value. In other words, 
insofar as we consider money an expression of value, that value does not reflect 
 
 53.  See generally Christine A. Desan, The Monetary Structure of Economic Activity (Harvard Pub. 
Law Working Paper, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3557233 
[https://perma.cc/YHP9-9B4T] (detailing the ways in which governments influence which assets are 
considered valuable).   
 54.  See generally Hockett & Omarova, supra note 6, at 1147 (arguing that the modern financial 
system is a public-private partnership between financial institutions and sovereigns); Perry Mehrling, 
Payment vs. Funding: The Law of Reflux for Today (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 
113, 2020) (illustrating payments elasticity through credit creation by private banks). Coined regimes 
built in elasticity by drawing on the collateralized nature of their money. Sovereigns could expand the 
money supply for private use (thus adding “elasticity”) by taking collateral as the content of coin that 
they agreed to mint in return. For the way the “free minting” (or minting on demand) system worked, 
see generally THOMAS J. SARGENT & FRANÇOIS R. VELDE, THE BIG PROBLEM OF SMALL CHANGE 
(2002), which documents the evolution of monetary theory and minting technology over 600 years. See 
also DESAN, supra note 5, at 70–71 (describing the free minting system in medieval England).  
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pre-existing preferences.55 Rather, the value expressed in money follows the 
practice of exchange in money and is a product of that exchange. 
Finally, in that process, the character of money as credit matters. In particular, 
credit money enters circulation selectively: it is an advance (a credit) made to 
some people relative to others. Thus money, inherent to the way it is constructed 
as credit, comes into use as a resource that some participants acquire first. That 
character affects the practices made with money, including the establishment of 
prices. At a formal level, money is allocatively partial; it cannot be a neutral 
medium. 
We can begin rethinking the process by which money is made and put into 
circulation where neoclassical approaches do. Like the unit hypothesized there, 
credit moneys can also be conceptualized at a theoretical level. The stakeholder 
model is one such attempt.56 The model starts from the premise that groups are 
as elemental as individuals in understanding exchange. Groups survive on the 
basis of contributions from members. At times, however, groups facing 
emergencies or sudden shortfalls want to mobilize help outside the usual 
schedule of member contributions. In that case, a stakeholder for the community 
can draft contributions from some members in advance and “pay” for that 
advance by giving them IOUs.  Each IOU confirms that the member has given a 
contribution early: it denominates that contribution as a credit, inviting the 
person holding the IOU to “redeem” it by turning in the IOU next time a member 
contribution is due, instead of making a new and additional contribution. The 
arrangement explains how a unit—written in the term of one contribution—
comes to entail value in a reliable way: The group has, collectively, a reference 
point for value—the recurring contributions made to it and anticipated in the 
future.57 
A second step explains how money moves from an accounting device to a 
medium. That transition, routinely assumed by economists, actually draws on the 
issuing authority’s decision to accept a public credit unit back from anyone’s 
hand, not only the individual initially paid. The accommodation greatly increases 
money’s capacity: it now serves not only public uses (mobilizing contributions 
 
 55.  Compare the Walrasian approach, which Orléan describes as identifying price as a matter 
“discover[ed]” by a comparison of values. See ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 46.  
 56.  I have elaborated the stakeholder theory at length elsewhere; it captures the “constitutional” 
aspect of money as an important dimension of governance. See DESAN, supra note 5, at 45–50; Christine 
Desan, Decoding the Design of Money, EUR. FIN. REV., Feb.–Mar. 2015, at 24. There are similar and 
contrasting models of credit-based money. See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Institutional Failure, Monetary 
Scarcity, and the Depreciation of the Continental, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 47 (1988); Farley Grubb, Chronic 
Specie Scarcity and Efficient Barter: The Problem of Maintaining an Outside Money Supply in British 
Colonial America, in INSIDE MONEY: RE-THEORIZING LIQUIDITY AS A MATTER OF DESIGN (Christine 
Desan ed., forthcoming); Bruce D. Smith, American Colonial Monetary Regimes: The Failure of the 
Quantity Theory and Some Evidence of an Alternate View, 18 CAN. J. ECON. 531 (1985); L. Randall Wray, 
Alternative Approaches to Money, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2010).  
 57.  For details, including the discounts that individuals may demand for advancing their labor and 
the premium that money carries as a transferable token, see DESAN, supra note 5, at 45–50, 70–107. The 
next paragraph is elaborated in the same sources. 
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through spending in IOUs) but private ones as well (exchange between 
individuals). In fact, individuals regularly want more money than the government 
puts into circulation for its own use. Communities routinely find ways to expand 
the credit money made by the public to service trade between individuals—thus 
the commercial bank money of the modern world.58 
Once communities have constructed a comparative unit that has relevance for 
participants, they will use it in exchange. Sharing an entity that entails value has 
novel importance in a community populated by people who, previously, had 
incommensurable needs and resources. In fact, the new money is uniquely 
appealing because people can use it to trade for objects they need or want.59 
That trading activity is contiguous with the character of the money used: 
participants have credit money, issued by governments and amplified by 
commercial banks. We must look to the nature of credit money—including the 
way it is introduced into a community of users—in order to understand the 
practice of exchange and the values that result. 
Understanding money as a public credit indicates that money enters 
circulation selectively. That phenomenon appears constitutive to the rationale 
and process of money creation. If so, the medium, with all its capacity for 
generating growth and widespread benefits, also carries an inherent non-
neutrality: the condition of allocative bias. The circumstances of making money 
not only produce an instrument with unparalleled relevance as a comparative 
unit, they also inject it unevenly into circulation. That condition will affect the 
way the market prices value in that money. 
To analyze the phenomenon, we need to unpack the reasons that a 
government or a bank creates a unit of credit. Recall that, under our public credit 
theory, a stakeholder would invent money by issuing credit, written in the term 
of anticipated revenue, when it needed to draft contributions to the group in 
advance of the time they were due. That innovation allows a stakeholder to hire 
certain people and acquire specific goods. Wartime is the paradigmatic example; 
not coincidentally, it is also a period when governments often create or redesign 
their moneys.60 A government spends on the industries and people that it needs 
for its defense. It then taxes back as it did originally, matching its selective 
dispensation of resources by taking in obligations owed more broadly. (In effect, 
the government is paying for the contributions it took in advance by sticking to 
the system that gives its IOUs value.) 
The strategy of issuing credit against future revenue is aimed, at bottom, at 
creating the capacity to spend specifically. If the government could obtain the 
 
 58.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 59.  Credit can be figured in the unit as well. It will have to be settled in money, and therefore 
remains tied to the issue and existence of the unit. N. J. Mayhew, Population, Money Supply, and the 
Velocity of Circulation in England, 1300-1700, 48 ECON. HIST. REV. 238, 253–54 (1995). 
 60.  Examples include early Anglo-Saxon innovation, the Bank of England, the assignats created 
during the French Revolution, and the Federal Reserve insofar as its mission, defined in 1913, was 
redefined by World War I a few years later.   
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flexibility it wanted by spending evenly (that is, hiring evenly) across the 
population, it could simply increase the routine contributions that everyone owes 
the group. In fact, pre-monetary governments and groups may frequently do or 
have done that—but those events would not be the instances in which they 
innovated money. There would be no reason to give out credit tokens to mark 
the advance of a contribution to the group: the whole population would have 
given resources and each person is in the same boat relative to others. By 
contrast, money as a credit represents a claim by an individual relative to the 
contributions due the community from her peers. Money, by definition, 
represents compensation to an individual for a disparate (advance) contribution. 
That condition indicates that the way money enters circulation influences 
production, distribution, and prices. Public spending for goods and services 
effectively allocates to certain hands a transactional medium that offers unique 
benefits—cash services—to individuals. We might imagine a government paying, 
consistently over time, those people with the skills and strength to be soldiers. 
That subset of society now holds an asset that others want; they will compete to 
supply the soldiers’ needs in particular, driving down prices for the goods that 
soldiers prefer. Those needing money will not make the same efforts to satisfy 
others, even if those people have significant amounts of wealth in other forms. 
Those forms do not carry the cash-quality that attaches to the credit medium. 
These dynamics will affect production and output in complex ways. They might 
increase the supply of goods demanded by the money monopolists at the expense 
of other goods, for example, or incentivize sellers to differentiate between 
segments of the market, lowering prices for the monopolists buying in bulk. In 
any case, the differential access to liquidity inherent in the way credit money 
enters circulation would affect relative prices and production in the market. 
Demand for the government’s money would also affect the willingness of 
people to sign up as soldiers or give other goods in advance. In negotiating for 
labor, a government might have to discount its medium, accepting less labor for 
full exoneration in the future or, conversely when demand for money by 
individuals is high, receiving a full contribution in advance.61 When people sell 
their services to the government for lower prices, those selling to the money 
monopolists would assumedly need to lower their prices a corresponding amount. 
But in that case as well, the prices that those without much money face for goods 
would remain relatively higher. 
The more consistently a government spends to one group, our soldiers for 
example, the more privileged that group is compared to others in society. Those 
others could of course adjust their skills and compete for the state’s business. But 
that change would be particularly difficult, given that they lack money to facilitate 
their retraining and relocating—transaction costs are built into the situation, as 
those conceptualizing the pre-monetary world as barter would agree. The fact 
 
 61.  For a mapping of this effect, see generally Desan, supra note 53. 
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that private demand for money modifies the structure of production suggests 
again that the way money enters circulation shapes economic exchange. 
In short, as the actor creating the money stock, the government is a sui generis 
party. Its approach to spending its money into circulation matters greatly. In 
modern polities like the United States, the government is the single largest actor 
in the economy—an economy written in its public credit medium, the dollar. 
Today, the federal government’s spending comprises twenty-one percent of 
GDP.62 Even aside from the way its balance of priorities affects health, education, 
welfare, infrastructure, and defense on their own terms, its allocation of money 
privileges certain beneficiaries with the allocation of a resource singular for its 
liquidity. That is the resource these beneficiaries will use to bid for goods and 
services in the market. The government’s authorship irrevocably affects, then, the 
relative values made in the unit it produces. 
But the allocative bias inherent in the character of money is more penetrating 
yet. The government destroys money as well as creating it. Like all credit, money 
has value until its moment of retirement. In the simple example here, where 
money holds value against an anticipated tax or public payment, that event 
cancels a unit of the medium.63 That corollary to spending reminds us that a 
government’s tax system becomes part of the allocative drama. 
Imagine that a community, like the one we assumed at the outset, levied a tax 
on all its members (that is, they all shared an obligation to contribute regularly 
to support it). Imagine also that the society converts to primarily using money. In 
other words, instead of taking in-kind contributions from people, the government 
generally spends to specific parties, and then takes taxes from the broader 
population in money. In the United States today, federal taxation matches 
spending in magnitude, if not precise quantity.64 In that case, money is no longer 
an optional resource for people, one that they want for reasons of their own 
exchange. Rather, individuals need the monetary resource to pay their public 
dues. Their need for money as a mode of payment means that they must deal with 
those who have that resource. They are tied into an economy in which people are 
differentiated by their access to money and the bargaining power it represents. 
 
 62.  THE WHITE HOUSE, BUDGET FOR A BETTER AMERICA (2019) https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/budget-fy2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MG7-5MGA] [hereinafter BUDGET]. 
The U.S. government spends about twenty percent of its budget on the military. See Kimberly Amadeo, 
US Military Budgets, Its Components, Challenges, and Growth, BALANCE (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.t 
hebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320 [https://perma.cc/5SGH-
D2RJ] (identifying expected military spending for fiscal year 2021 at $934 billion); Kimberly Amadeo, 
US Federal Budget Breakdown, BALANCE (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-federal-
budget-breakdown-3305789 [https://perma.cc/36JF-ZUV4] [hereinafter US Federal Budget Breakdown] 
(identifying $4.829 trillion in projected total federal spending in fiscal year 2021). It spends another sixty 
percent on entitlements. US Federal Budget Breakdown, supra.  
 63.  The American colonies ran economies based on classic tax anticipation currencies. See, e.g., 
Calomiris, supra note 56. 
 64.  Federal taxation is about 16.5% relative to GDP; government debt makes up the difference 
between federal spending and taxing. Kimberly Amadeo, US Federal Government Tax Revenue, 
BALANCE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/current-u-s-federal-government-tax-revenue-
3305762 [https://perma.cc/T782-KG75].  
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The modern architecture of money creation adds another twist to the drama. 
Most modern governments do not create money by spending it directly into 
circulation.65 Governments today tax in already-existing money (money created 
in an earlier round of government action) and spend those funds. They also 
borrow previously issued money now in private hands. By contrast, governments 
increase the money supply—or create new money—when their central banks 
purchase public debt, the very debt that governments issue when they borrow.66 
Central banks purchase that public debt (or other qualified assets) by issuing 
credit—new public credit money or fiat money—for it. In the modern world, 
then, money creation is conducted through a circuitous route, one mediated by 
central banks and public debt (and other assets).67 
The circuitous route taken in the modern world also matters. Politically, the 
system came about by happenstance, improvisation, and some shrewd 
calculation: the strategy created an alliance between government and investors. 
The design offered an asset to those with money to lend the government; as an 
investment, a government bond was relatively safe, especially as governments 
learned to monetize those bonds when they needed to. At the same time, the 
design offered governments good lenders and political allies. Relatedly, the 
arrangement established a device that reinforced the government’s commitment 
to tax in a disciplined way; there was now a group of creditors with a particular 
interest in that practice. No doubt the design also increased the credibility of the 
government by yoking investors into a set of supporting obligations, originally 
including the responsibility of redeeming their own notes in coin.68 
But independent from (or implicit in) those important innovations is that the 
modern architecture channels money creation through finance—the central 
bank’s purchase of either public debt or other qualified investment assets. The 
system, by its very design, sorts members of the public who hold enough money 
to invest in financial instruments from those who do not. A flow of funds to the 
former is built into the way modern governments add to the money supply. 
Today, the government’s debt channels an amount equivalent to ten percent of 
 
 65.  They always retain the ability to do so, however, and regularly recur to it. Civil War greenbacks, 
Treasury notes, and early American paper money are moneys made by that method. Coin is somewhat 
similar: insofar as governments require payment in coin and make mints available to convert bullion into 
coin, they effectively draft people to supply a currency made of metal that the government then collects 
and spends.  
 66.  Central banks can also purchase other qualified assets, increasing the money supply by that 
route as well. 
 67.  See Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 772–87 (2018) 
(detailing modern monetary policy in the United States); Christine Desan, Money Creation by the 
Federal Reserve: A Note on the Basics of Legal Authority (2019) (draft on file with author) (detailing 
the role of the Federal Reserve in the creation of money). Randall Wray argues that, in addition, 
government deficit spending effectively increases the money supply. See L. Randall Wray, Outside 
Money: The Advantages of Owning the Magic Porridge Pot, in INSIDE MONEY, supra note 56. 
 68.  Initially, national banks were privately owned. A group of investors agreed to lend to a 
government, taking its national debt and issuing their private promises-to-pay. The government then 
spent and taxed in those promises, assimilating them to its own money. The dollar is, thus, a “Federal 
Reserve Note.” See generally DESAN, supra note 5, at 295–329.  
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GDP to investors.69 The construction is a striking aspect, arguably definitional, of 
modern capitalism.70 
The conclusion that money enters circulation selectively holds when we add 
commercial banks to the analysis. Those institutions expand the money supply by 
issuing deposits against private borrowing, the longer-term loans they make to 
customers. Banks extend that credit by making promises-to-pay the official unit 
of account, with the permission of the issuing sovereign and the support of its 
payments system.71 Those commercial entities thus hold a significant monopoly 
in the contemporary system as agents of money creation.72 
Banks claim that role according to a particular theory: they are supposed to 
be experts in allocating credit. Commercial lenders are entrepreneurs out to 
make a profit from lending money. Motivated by their own interest in getting 
repaid by borrowers, they use local knowledge and experience to find those 
people and projects most likely to generate a material return in the length of the 
loan period. They make loans only to those prospects.73 
The banks’ strategy maximizes the chance that the credit they extend will be 
returned to them with interest. By the same token, the strategy virtually 
advertises that banks will selectively dispense access to money, as represented by 
their extension of private credit. Projects that promise a profit to bankers 
become, literally, the occasion for money creation through the issue of deposits. 
By contrast, projects that cannot promise a profit will not be similarly blessed—
even if they contribute to the social good in non-material ways, are productive in 
nonmonetary ways, are simply slow to mature in terms of monetary profit, or fail 
to motivate bankers to lend for an arbitrary reason. In other words, commercial 
banks create money in accord with their priorities; their distributive rationale 
affects the way private credit money issues and to whom. They also affect, thus, 
the way prices are set. 
There are, in other words, no “helicopter drops” of money as in the textbook 
hypotheticals. Rather, the rationale for creating a monetary unit, whether the 
money was made by a sovereign government or the deposit issued by a bank, is 
to spend it selectively. The patterns by which money enters circulation bless 
 
 69.  BUDGET, supra note 62, at 109; see also US Federal Budget Breakdown, supra note 62. 
 70.  For the impact on wealth and its distribution, see, for example, SANDY BRIAN HAGER, PUBLIC 
DEBT, INEQUALITY, AND POWER: THE MAKING OF A MODERN DEBT STATE (2016). For a definition 
of capitalism based on this and related changes in money’s design, see DESAN, supra note 5, at 5–6.  
 71.  For the relevant law in the United States, see, for example, Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663 
(1866).  
 72.  More recently, other financial entities have found ways to construct and issue what some 
scholars call “near-moneys,” repo agreements, and similar instruments that they use to fund investments 
in the capital markets. See generally GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 
2007 (2010). Those “shadow banks” also depend on the sovereign unit of account, drawing credit from 
conventional banks, clearing in the sovereign unit and, as of the Financial Crisis, relying on the Federal 
Reserve (and other central banks) for support. 
 73.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, FIRST REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CREDIT (1790), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-02-0076-0002-0001 [https://perma.cc/MY26-
U5S5]; Amar Bhidé, Why We Need Traditional Banking, NAT’L AFF., Winter 2018, at 78.  
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people differentially with access to the resource of liquidity. Exchange takes 
place in those circumstances. 
In short, recognizing why societies make money and how they do it recasts 
the way we approach the market and the values we observe there. First, societies 
create a unit of account because their members (including public officials) need 
a way to compare values that are otherwise not commensurable. Making money 
out of credit works to that end: it produces a unit of substantive value that is 
relevant to all or most individuals because each person can use it to satisfy their 
political dues or, in the case of bank money, to repay their loans. That innovation 
allows exchange to take place: using the unit, people will make deals for money. 
That process generates prices. 
In that process, the character of money as credit matters: by its very structure, 
money only enters circulation as it is allocated by governments and banks to 
particular parties. That selectivity affects the exchange that follows. It means that, 
according to the way money is created—definitionally we might say—individuals 
will not be equally situated in the process that generates prices. Decisions about 
value are made in the wake of that fact. 
 
IV 
CONCLUSION: INCOMMENSURABLE APPROACHES 
Considering money as a public credit generates a profoundly different 
approach to value than that in neoclassical formulations. For many in that 
tradition, the market is conceptualized as a forum or process in which individuals 
express pre-existing preferences according to a self-evident measure. By contrast, 
the public credit approach suggests that groups build a touchstone for value by 
configuring their relations—thus the credit unit they create out of political 
obligation.74 That unit allows comparison and exchange, activities that produce 
the market and the prices observed there. 
Just as neoclassical formulations have normative implications, so also does 
the credit approach. Most conspicuously, the credit approach recasts the image 
of democracy and its possibility. Recall that the neoclassical tradition offers a 
vision of democracy that turns fundamentally around maximizing choice, the 
freedom to name value and claim it. Agents bid independently, insulated from 
undue influence, ideally in the auction setting. In that vision, public activity is a 
neutral coordinating device—the auctioneer and its abstract numeraire. 
By contrast, understanding money as a public credit medium locates 
collective action as foundational to market regimes. Governance is catalytic in 
creating commensurable value for a particular community. That governance is a 
relational matter—it recognizes groups as composed of contributing members. 
Moreover, it creates its touchstone for value, the unit of account, by reorganizing 
their relations when it accepts resources early from some and advances them 
 
 74.  For a focus on this process as a way to package political obligation in a circulating unit, see 
generally Desan, supra note 53.   
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credit relative to others. Democracy becomes a matter that starts with mutual 
contribution but requires even more. It entails a complex system in which a group 
sustains itself by structuring its growth and character through a process of 
soliciting and managing resources, distributing benefits, and spreading costs—all 
difficult matters that require discussion and deliberation. 
That project is expansive. It includes making public credit—money—for 
public needs and goals, as well as private exchange. On the first, we can 
understand the tight fit between modernization and money, between political 
capacity and robust fiscal states, and between monetary innovation and 
mobilization for war, welfare, economic development, or other reasons.75 The 
connection between money and society suggests that money is an infrastructural 
resource and collective good.76 Recognizing money as a public credit medium 
thus frames political activity as a significant component of money’s genealogy 
and purpose. 
As for private exchange, we should understand the way modern communities 
structure credit and its allocation as critical decisions about the market society 
they are creating. The determination to identify commercial banks as the conduit 
for money creation shapes what kind of projects and industries find funds and 
prosper. More generally, the financial system as a whole is an elaborately 
engineered dimension of governance in modern polities. Its dynamics, an 
operation carried out in official units of account and structured by permissions 
and defaults of public authority, determine the flow of material wealth, privilege, 
and voice. 
At an elemental level, recognizing money as public credit installs a particular 
challenge at the heart of democratic governance in a monetary world. Rather 
than suggesting the priority of protecting individual autonomy, it poses as 
fundamental the difficulty of ensuring equality. Making money is an 
emancipatory innovation for communities because it allows them to create 
commensurability in value. But that project, by its very unfolding, orders people 
in disparate ways and begets differential access to money itself. Far from 




 75.  See, e.g., JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 
1688-1783 (1988); Isaac William Martin et al., The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of 
the New Fiscal Sociology, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND 
HISTORICAL DIMENSION (Isaac William Martin et al. eds., 2009); Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM 
MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1958).  
 76.  See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, 
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015); Ricks, supra note 67. 
